Abstract
Introduction
Default risk and liquidity risk have long been perceived as two of the main justifications for a positive corporate spread, the yield difference between a corporate bond and a comparable government bond. It is widely recognized that corporate spreads reflect not only default risk determined by firms' ability to meet their debt obligations but also liquidity risk affected by transaction costs occurred in the secondary bond market. However, many structural models of credit risk 1 ignore liquidity risk when they study default risk. They implicitly assume that default risk, which is determined by firms' fundamentals, is independent from liquidity risk, which is affected by microstructure frictions in the corporate bond market. As a result, a number of empirical studies, such as Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2004) , Han and Zhou (2008) , Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2009), and Schwarz (2010) , use this assumption to separate liquidity risk from default risk in their studies. The assumption of independence between liquidity and default risk could be a good approximation in normal times when the difference between internal and external financing cost is low. But default risk and liquidity risk can interact with each other during liquidity crises. The 2007 The -2008 subprime crisis vividly demonstrates the importance of such an interaction that a deterioration of short-term funding market liquidity caused severe problem for many financial institutions, which in turn exacerbated their credit risk. The historic magnitude of the financial crisis emphasizes the importance of understanding economic channels, such as firms' internal financial resources and external financial constraints, through which liquidity risk could exacerbate default risk. This paper provides empirical evidence on these issues by studying the effect of the financial crisis on default risk of US industrial firms.
The hypotheses I take to the data are based on a couple of recent theoretical papers, i.e. Morris and Shin (2009) and He and Xiong (2010) , which explicitly model the interaction between liquidity risk and default risk. They also propose possible economic channels, such as short-term funding needs and cash holdings, through which a liquidity shock can have a magnified effect on default risk. On one hand, short-term funding needs could exacerbate the impact of a liquidity shock on default risk because of either the "bank-run" phenomenon caused by the coordination problem among short-term debt holders (see Morris and Shin (2009)) or the "debt-overhung" problem caused by the conflict between debt holders and equity holders (see He and Xiong (2010) ). On the other hand, substantial internal resources, such as cash reserves, can act as a buffer to mitigate the impact of a liquidity shock.
I use the 2007-2008 credit crisis as an event to test their predictions. Gorton (2008) shows that this crisis originated from problems arising from the market of mortgage-backed securities. A sharp price reverse of those securities and the lack of transparency on long-term investments of financial institutions led to a panic that shut down their funding supply. The crisis spilled over into corporate sectors in late 2007 with a large increase in corporate spreads. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that banks dramatically reduced supply of loans to corporate sectors during the crisis, resulting in a large increase in the cost of external finance faced by US industrial firms. Therefore, the increase in financing cost during the crisis can be arguably treated as an exogenous supply shock to US industrial firms. As shown in (CDS) . CDS spreads are better measures of default risk than corporate spreads because the latter are more likely to be affected by microstructure frictions in corporate bond market (see, e.g., Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) and Bao, Pan, and Wang (2010) ). I explore cross-firm differences in changes of CDS spreads from the normal period to the crisis period, and investigate how the differences are related to firms' short-term financing needs and cash holdings. Inference, however, can be confounded if firms' decisions on internal financial positions are endogenous to unobservable firm characteristics that are related to default risk.
The literature on debt structure shows that the choice between short-term and long-term debt is correlated with firm characteristics such as size, growth opportunities, profitability, and default risk (see, e.g., Barclay and Clifford W. Smith (1995) , Guedes and Opler (1996) , and Stohs and Mauer (1996) ). As a result, the determination of debt maturity creates difficulties to identify causal effects of debt structure on default risk. Instead of contrasting short-term and long-term debt, I exploit ex-ante heterogeneity in firms' long-term debt maturity. I look at the proportion of long-term debt that matures right after the onset of the credit crisis to gauge the impact of the crisis on default risk. Long-term debt is usually held by various investors and very difficult to renegotiate on short notice, and thus it is reasonable to assume that firms are not at their debt-maturity target all the time. In addition, transaction cost associated with issuing long-term debt and market-timing by managers probably prevent firms from diversifying long-term debt maturity. Because the decision on firms' long-term debt is made many years prior to the onset of the financial crisis, whether firms are pre-scheduled to refinance a significant portion of their long-term debt is plausibly exogenous to firms' default risk following the crisis. In the base regression, Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2010) and Benmelech and Dvir (2010) use the same method to identify exogenous variations in short-term funding needs in their respective studies.
The literature on cash holdings shows that decisions on cash holdings are correlated with firm characteristics such as growth opportunities, riskness of the business, accessibility to external finance and corporate governance (see, e.g., Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) and Dittmar and MahrtSmith (2007) ). Cash holdings are also found to be related to default risk. Archarya, Davydenko, and Strebulaev (2008) demonstrate that the previous puzzling finding of a positive relation between default risk and cash holdings (see, e.g. Altman (1968)) can be explained by a model with endogenously determined optimal cash holdings. To identify exogenous variations in firms' cash holdings that are not related to default risk following the onset of the crisis, I first estimate a regression based on the findings of the cash holding literature to establish the "normal" cash holdings for a firm, and then compute the "excess" cash holdings as the difference between the actual cash holdings and model-predicted cash holdings. I construct excess cash holdings using 2005 financial statements, one and half year before the onset of the crisis, to alleviate concerns about possible endogenous relation between excess cash holdings and default risk. I also use 2003 and 2004 financial statements to compute excess cash holdings as a robustness check.
I am interested in studying the relation between firms' pre-crisis internal financial positions and postcrisis default risk. To address this issue, I employ a differences-in-differences approach in which I compare default risk before and after the onset of the crisis as a function of pre-crisis internal financial positions, controlling for firm fixed effects and firm characteristics related to default risk. I also investigate whether the mitigating effect of internal financial resources depends on external financial constraints. In this paper, the base specification regresses firm-level quarterly CDS spreads over the period of 2006:Q1-2008:Q4 on a dummy variable indicating whether the quarter is after the onset of the financial crisis, and on the interaction of this dummy variable with pre-crisis financial positions, controlling for firm fixed effects and firm characteristics related to default risk. Consequently, the main framework is similar to an instrument variable approach under the assumption that firms' pre-crisis financial positions are not related to their unobservable within-firm changes in default risk following the onset of the crisis. I also perform falsification tests that replicate the estimation procedure in non-crisis periods. In principle, the default risk of a firm should not be affected by debt maturity if its debt matures at a time when external funding is easily available. Neither should its cash holdings have a significant impact on default risk in non-crisis periods. It is only the incidence of debt maturing during a credit crisis that should exacerbate default risk. The impact of cash holdings on default risk should also be easier to detect in a liquidity crisis.
As an additional source of identification, I conduct cross-sectional analysis based on firm-level measure of financial constraints which have been found to affect corporate investment and equity prices (see, e.g., Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Requejo (2001) , Whited and Wu (2006) , and Livdan, Sapriza, and Zhang (2009) ). In this paper, I consider four measures of financial constraints: the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index (the KZ index), the Whited and Wu (2006) index (the WW index), firm sizes measured by total assets, and credit ratings provided by Standard & Poor's. However, a standard criticism of financial constraints as an identification device is that because financial constraint measures are computed using firm-level variables, they are to some extent endogenous to choices made by firms which could also affect default risk. To alleviate this concern, I compute financial constraint measures at the end of 2005. With cross-firm data on internal financial positions and external financial constraints, I examine whether the relation between pre-crisis internal financial positions and post-crisis default risk is stronger for financially constrained firms. In theory, the impact of the crisis should be greater for firms that are financially constrained. In addition, the lack of internal financial resources should exacerbate the impact of the crisis more for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms, and excess cash reserves should be more valuable for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms to mitigate the impact. The main findings of this paper are follows.
Consistent with a serious liquidity shock worsened by short-term funding needs, post-crisis CDS spreads are significantly positively related to the proportion of long-term debt maturing in 2008. CDS spreads increase by 104 basis points for firms without any long-term debt maturing in 2008. A onestandard-deviation increase in the proportion of long-term debt maturing in 2008 adds an additional 53 basis point increase in CDS spreads, or 51% of the increase for firms that need not to refinance longterm debt. In addition, post-crisis CDS spreads significantly negatively related to pre-crisis excess cash holdings, consistent with internal resources mitigating the impact of a liquidity shock. CDS spreads increase by 172 basis points for firms with zero pre-crisis excess cash reserves. A one-standard-deviation increase in pre-crisis excess cash holdings mitigate the increase by 28-40 basis points depending on the models used to compute excess cash holdings.
To further rule out differences in CDS responses caused by unobserved firm heterogeneity, such as "smart managers" anticipating the upcoming credit crisis and adjusting their financial positions prior to the crisis, I also use the 2003 and 2004 financial statements to compute the proportion of long-term debt that matures in 2008. I obtain very similar results using the 2004 data and slightly stronger results using the 2003 data. I lag the excess cash reserve measures by one and two years respectively, and obtain very similar results too. In addition, I repeat these specifications for a non-crisis (placebo) period of [2004] [2005] [2006] in which there is no economy-wide shocks comparable to the financial crisis. The results show that debt maturity and excess cash reserves are unrelated with changes in CDS spreads, providing evidence that the results are not spuriously driven by some mechanical factors.
Further consistent with a severe liquidity shock worsened by financial constraints, the increase in CDS spreads is significantly larger for financially constrained firms. As I do with firms' internal financial positions, I measure financial constraints at the end of 2005, one and half year prior to the onset of the financial crisis. Coefficient estimates are both economically large and statistically significant for three of the four measures of financial constraints, the exception being the firm size. The estimates imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in the KZ index and the WW index respectively is associated with an additional 65 and 37 basis point increase in CDS spreads following the onset of the crisis. A one nudge reduction in pre-crisis bond ratings is associated with an additional 36 basis point increase in CDS I also explore the interaction between internal financial positions and external financial constraints by first dividing firms into three groups according to their financial constraint measures, and then assessing the relation between their pre-crisis internal financial positions and post-crisis default risk for each group. Point estimates suggest that the impact of internal financial positions on post-crisis default risk generally becomes stronger as firms become more financially constrained. The coefficient estimates are economically large and statistically significant only for the top tercil firms (the most financially constrained firms), and only in three of the four constraint measures in the case of the debt maturity, and only in two of the four constraint measures in the case of excess cash reserves. From the regression results with debt maturity and the KZ index, I estimate an additional increase of 129 basis points in CDS spreads following the onset of the crisis for a top tercil firm comparing to a bottom tercil firm, both without any long-term debt that matures in 2008. If the top tercile firm needs to refinance its long-term debt equivalent to 5.1%
(the one-standard-deviation of the debt maturity variable for the top tercil group) of total assets in 2008, there is an additional increase of 117 basis points in CDS spreads. The impact of the financial crisis is most severe for firms that are ex-ante financially constrained and have large short-term funding needs or few internal resources right after the onset of the crisis. As discussed in the main body of the paper, firms used in this study have large sizes and have access to bond market. As a result, they are likely less financially constrained than the majority of US industrial firms. The results presented in this paper should be interpreted as a lower bound on the importance of firms' internal financial positions during the crisis.
Overall, the findings regarding the importance of internal liquidity resources, financial constraints, and external funding cost for default risk during the financial crisis are consistent with the predictions of theoretical models developed by Morris and Shin (2009) and He and Xiong (2010) that short-term funding needs exacerbate the impact of a liquidity shock on default risk, while extra cash reserves mitigate the impact. I also find that the impact of the crisis is more severe for financially constrained firms. In addition, the magnifying effect of internal financial positions on the impact of the crisis is further amplified for financially constrained firms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discuses related literature. Section 3 describes the data and empirical estimation method. Section 4 presents empirical results, and section 5 concludes.
Related Literature
This paper is related and contributes to several branches of literature. First, it is naturally related to the literature on credit risk and liquidity risk. Following the seminar work by Merton (1974) , most structural models of credit risk assume that a firm defaults when the market value of its assets falls below a threshold. In this framework, new equity can be issued with no cost to finance its funding needs. As a result, the firm's cash holdings do not play any role in the model. In addition, the firm is usually assumed to have a very simple debt structure so there is no conflict between short-term debt holders and long-term debt holders. Although Leland (1994) , Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) , Leland and Toft (1996) , Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) , and others have extended the structural model in many dimensions, the basic assumption of no costly external finance remains. A large empirical literature has devoted to test these structural models. The general finding is that model-implied corporate spreads are too low compared to observed corporate spreads (see, e.g., Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984) and Huang and Huang (2003) ). In addition, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) find that economic variables based on the structural models leave a large portion of corporate spread changes unexplained. One approach to reconcile the difference between theoretical prediction and empirical evidence is to assume that illiquidity in the corporate bond market is also priced in corporate yield spreads since the corporate bond market is much less liquid than the government bond market. In fact, empirical studies, such as Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) and Bao, Pan, and Wang (2010) , construct firm-level illiquidity measures based on market-microstructure literature and find supporting evidence that illiquidity is priced in corporate bond spreads. Their finding, however, is not inconsistent with the assumption of independence between liquidity risk and default risk. With the development of the CDS market, Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo (2009) test the structural models with CDS spreads, and find that economic variables based on traditional structural models can explain a much larger portion of CDS spread changes than that of corporate spread changes. In addition, Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008) show that traditional structural models, including the simplest Merton (1974) model, can produce accurate hedge ratios, e.g. the sensitivity of corporate bond returns to the value of equity. These findings suggest that although traditional structural models cannot match the level and dynamics of corporate bond spreads, the unexplained portion is likely unrelated to default risk. Moreover, empirical constructed illiquidity measures seem to have low statistical correlation with default risk measures. All the evidence leads a number of studies to explicitly use the independent assumption. For example, Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2004) and Han and Zhou (2008) use this assumption to decompose corporate bond spreads into a liquidity component and a default component. Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2009) apply the same assumption to separate "flight to quality" and "flight to liquidity" phenomenons in European sovereign bond markets.
The assumption of independence between liquidity risk and default risk may be a good approximation in normal times when external funds are easily obtained. This assumption does not hold in liquidity crises. Ericsson and Renault (2006) allow bond market liquidity risk to be related to a firm's default risk, and find a positive correlation between liquidity risk and default risk using US corporate bond data. However, they do not specify economic channels through which firms can mitigate or worsen the impact of liquidity shocks on their default risk. Morris and Shin (2009) incorporate the insights from the bank-run literature (see, e.g., Diamond and Dybvig (1983) ) into a stylized model to examine the interaction between liquidity risk and default risk. They show that a negative fundamental shock can increase the probability of bankruns, i.e. short-term debt holders not rolling over their debt, and thus increase the default probability of a bank. Lack of cash holdings or overly relying on short-term financing will magnify the impact on default risk. Although their model is build to study banks' default risk, the same logic can be applied to industrial firms. He and Xiong (2010) embed the spirit of Myers (1977) into the Leland and Toft (1996) model. They show that even in the absence of any constraints for firms to raise outside equity, an increase in debt market liquidity can cause the firm to default at a higher fundamental threshold because equity holders may not be willing to absorb losses by rolling over short-term debts. Doing that will first benefit existing long-term debt holders since they have senior claims on firm revenue. As a result, a deterioration of debt market liquidity makes it more costly for equity holders to keep the firm alive. It increases the probability of a firm to optimally choose default if the firm has to roll over a large portion of its debt during a liquidity crisis. To test their hypotheses, I study the impact of the financial crisis on default risk by exploring exogenous cross-firm heterogeneity in short-term funding needs and cash reserves. I provide empirical evidence supporting their prediction that short-term funding needs magnify the impact of liquidity shocks on default risk, while cash holdings mitigate the impact. One important implication is that using CDS spreads to control for the default component in corporate spreads can significantly under-estimate the impact of liquidity risk for firms that lack internal resources, especially during a severe liquidity crisis. This paper contributes to the financial constraint literature by examining the effects of financial constraints on default risk. Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Requejo (2001), Whited and Wu (2006) , and Livdan, Sapriza, and Zhang (2009) study the effects of financial constraints on equity prices, and find that financial constraint risk is priced in cross-sectional equity returns. I provide empirical evidence that financial constraints are also priced in the credit derivative market. In addition, I show that financial constraints play an important role in determining the magnifying effect of firms' internal financial positions on default risk during the financial crises. Only for financially constrained firms, pre-crisis internal financial positions are statistically correlated with post-crisis default risk.
This work is also related to a number of papers that study the cause and consequences of the finan-cial crisis on US industrial firms. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) find that banks dramatically reduce their lending to the corporate sector during the crisis. Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) and Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2010) study the real impact of the crisis on corporate activities, and find that crisis significantly reduces investment. Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2009) (2008)) focuses on the agency cost associated with cash holdings, this paper highlights the precautionary motive associated with cash reserves. I find that "seemingly" excess cash reserves computed based on the previous literature significantly mitigate the impact of the financial crisis on default risk. This paper sheds new light on the precautionary motive associated with cash reserves from a different angle.
Finally, this paper is related to the empirically literature that studies the market microstructure frictions and their impact on credit derivative instruments. Bongaerts, de Jong, and Driessen (2009) and Tang and Yan (2008) show that CDS market frictions, such as transaction cost, searching cost, and inventory risk are priced in CDS spreads. In this paper, I use the number of dealers who provide CDS quotes as a liquidity proxy for CDS contracts. The parameter estimates for the liquidity proxy are economically and statistically and significant across all specifications. A static comparative analysis shows that a 5 basis point reduction in CDS spreads is associated with an increase of one dealer who provides quotes on that CDS contract. My results are consistent with findings in the previous literature.
Data and Empirical Method

Variables
In this study, I use quoted prices of credit default swaps written on US industrial firms to measure default risk. A credit default swap is a bilateral contract that provides default insurance for the protection buyer.
The protection seller pays the protection buyer up to the notional value of a reference bond in a credit event, which is triggered by a bankruptcy, failure to pay, or a debt-restructuring by the reference entity.
In return, the protection buyer pays the protection seller a quarterly premium, quoted as an annualized percentage of the notional value. I use CDS spreads instead of corporate spreads to measure the price of default risk because the former are less susceptible to various market microstructure frictions that have been found to affect corporate bond spreads (see, e.g., Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2004) and Garleanu and Pedersen (2009)). I use issuer ticker and name to merge firms' equity and balance-sheet data with the CDS spread data provided by Markit. Issuer tickers and names are manually checked to ensure the merge accuracy. Markit provides daily composite spread quotes on CDS contracts with maturities from 6 months to 30 years. These composite quotes represent the average of the midpoint of bid and ask quotes from a number of major dealers. Markit calculates daily values only for contracts that have quotes from at least two different contributors after they filter out outliers, stale quotes, and flat curves. I use CDS quotes on corporate U.S. bond issuers denominated in U.S. dollars with reference issues ranked senior.
In particular, I focus on 5-year CDS data with modified restructuring clauses because they are the most liquid CDS contracts traded in the credit derivatives market. I use end of quarter CDS quotes to match firms' balance-sheet data obtained from Compustat. I restrict the data set by eliminating firms with CDS quotes for less than one year. In addition, I exclude all firms in financial and utility industries with SIC codes inside the intervals 4900-4949 and 6000-6999. I also eliminate non-profit or government entities with SIC codes larger than 8000. I further restrict the data set by excluding firms without equity or balance-sheet information.
As motivated by structural credit risk models and subsequently validated by empirical findings, a significant portion of variations in default risk can be attributed to firm characteristics. Following this literature, I obtain the following variables from the Compustat quarterly: leverage, cash flow volatility, profit, size, asset growth, sale growth, and Torbin's Q. Details on the construction of these variables are provided in the Appendix. I also obtain Standard & Poor's issuer credit ratings to control for firm-specific default risk which are not captured by those balance-sheet variables. I convert the S&P's credit ratings into a numeric scale 2 to be used in the following regression analysis. CDS contracts are traded over the counter. Although the 5-year contract is the most liquid among all maturities, it is still subject to market frictions, such as search costs, adverse selection, and inventory costs. Bongaerts, de Jong, and Driessen (2009) and Tang and Yan (2008) show that CDS market frictions are priced in CDS spreads. To control for CDS market frictions, I use the number of dealers who provide CDS quotes as a liquidity proxy for CDS contracts.
As discussed in the previous section, I use firms' long-term debt that matures in 2008 to capture the exogenous variations in short-term funding needs during the 2007-2008 credit crisis. The data on debt maturity variables are only available in the Compustat annual file. I merge the annual and the quarterly files to obtain debt maturity information. Compustat annual items dd1, dd2, dd3, dd4, and dd5 respectively represents the dollar amount of long-term debt maturing during the first year after the annual report, during the second year after the report, and so on. Compustat annual item dltt represents the dollar amount of debt matures in more than 1 year. Accordingly, a firm's total long-term debt is the sum of dd1 and dltt. I apply the following filters to the debt maturity variables. First, I delete firms with total long-term debt (dd1 +dltt) greater than total assets (at). Second, I delete firms for which the data on long-term debt maturity shows inconsistency, such as negative long-term debt maturing in more than 1 year (dltt), and debt maturing in more than one year (dltt) less than the sum of dd2, dd3, dd4, and dd5. I also require that the ratio of long-term debt maturing beyond 1 year (dltt) to total assets (at) is larger than 5%. The last restriction is to ensure that this paper is not contrasting firms that can issue long-term debt vs those that cannot. To capture cross-firm variations in long-term debt that matures in To capture exogenous cross-firm variations in cash reserves, I first establish the "normal" cash holdings for a firm. This step is based on the work of Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Archarya, Davydenko, and Strebulaev (2008) . I then compute excess cash holdings as the difference between actual cash holdings and model predicted. Previous literature on optimal cash holding has identified several reasons for firm to hold cash, such as supporting dayto-day operations and preparing for possible investment opportunities. Most empirical models of cash holdings control for firm size, working capital, cash flow, growth opportunities, cash flow volatility, and access to external finance. They also include year fixed effects to control for macroeconomic conditions. Recent work by Archarya, Davydenko, and Strebulaev (2008) provides another motive for firms' to hold more cash, i.e. reducing bankruptcy cost associated with default risk. So I augment specifications in the previous literature with credit ratings. Two specifications are employed to estimate normal cash holdings:
In the above equations, CH is the ratio of cash holdings to total assets; LNAT is the natural log of total assets; CF is the ratio of cash flow to total assets; NWC is the ratio of net working capital excluding cash to total assets; ICFV is a firm's 3-digit industry cash flow volatility; TBQ is Tobin's Q; SPR is Standard & Poor's credit ratings; LVG is the leverage; CAPX is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets; DVD is a dividend dummy that equals to one if a firm pays dividends during a fiscal year; and (2008)). Following the literature, I compute the KZ index and the WW index respectively according to the following formulas:
where TLTD is the ratio of the long-term debt to total assets; TDV is the ratio of total dividends to total assets; ISG is the 3-digit industry sales growth; and SG is the firms' sales growth. I compute the four financial constraint measures using the 2005 data in the benchmark regression. I also use the 2003 and 2004 data to compute the measures as robustness checks.
Summary Statistics
The that financial constraints are negatively correlated with firm sizes, and that firms with credit ratings are less constrained than those without ratings. As a result, the impact of the financial crisis on the default risk of an average US company is probably more severe than the impact on the average firm used in this paper. The results should probably be interpreted as a lower bound on the estimate of the impact of the financial crisis on default risk of US industrial firms. Table 2 
Empirical Methodology
I am most interested in examining whether firms' pre-crisis internal financial resources and external financial constraints mitigate or worsen the impact of the financial crisis on default risk. The inference of the effect of the financial crisis on default risk relies on the interaction between firms' pre-crisis financial positions and a dummy variable that takes value of one if a quarter is after the onset of the crisis. Following the standard differences-in-differences approach, I embed the dummy variable and the interaction between the dummy variable and pre-crisis variables into a CDS spread regression, controlling for firm fixed effects and firm characteristics. The basic regression specification is the following:
where i and t represent firm and quarter respectively. Among included variables, CDS denotes the CDS spread, α firm fixed effects, D the dummy variable, X the pre-crisis variable that measure either firms' internal financial positions or external financial constraints, and Y firm-level control variables, including leverage, cash flow volatility, profitability, size, asset growth, sales growth, Tobin's Q, S&P credit rating, and the liquidity proxy for CDS contracts. The last variable is included to control for cross-firm heterogeneity in CDS liquidity. I lag the balance sheet variables and credit ratings by one quarter in all regressions to avoid look-ahead bias since the report of financial statements is sometimes delayed.
In the above regression, the level effect of pre-crisis variables is subsumed by firm fixed effects since pre-crisis variables are measured only once per firm. I am most interested in parameter γ because it measures how firms' pre-crisis financial conditions are related to post-crisis default risk. However, the persistence of CDS spreads makes series correlation a concern for the estimation of equation (1).
Following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and Petersen (2009) , I adjust standard errors to be heteroscedasticity-consistent and cluster them at the firm level.
Results
Debt Maturity and Excess Cash Holdings
In this section I investigate whether firms' pre-crisis internal financial positions affect the impact of the financial crisis on default risk, and present estimates from the base specification described in the previous section. Table 3 reports an estimate of the effect of firms' maturity structure of long-term debt at the end of 2005 on the impact of the financial crisis on their default risk. Columns 1 and 2, which do not include the interaction of the dummy variable and debt maturity variable, establish the basic pattern. Column 1 shows that the CDS level of an average firm increased by 146 basis points following the onset of the crisis, an increase of 114% relative to the pre-crisis unconditional mean. It illustrates the severe impact of the financial crisis on the default risk of US corporate sector. Adding firm-level control variables in Column 2 reduces the increase only to 123 basis points.
Columns 3 to 5 show the effect of firms' pre-crisis debt structure on the impact of financial crisis.
In column 3, I include only the dummy variables, the interaction of the dummy variable with the debt maturity variable, and firm fixed effects. The estimate for the interaction term is positive but not statistically significant. In column 4, I introduce firm leverage and cash flow volatility as suggested by traditional structural models in the regression. The estimate for the interaction term becomes bigger and statistically significant at 10% level. In column 5, I introduce into the regression a battery of control variables described in the previous section. The estimate for the interaction term is statistically significant at 5% level with a magnitude of 0.116. The results suggest that the effect of debt maturity on the impact of the crisis depends on firm characteristics. The estimates for the dummy variables across various specifications are always statistically significant. The coefficient estimates in column 5 imply that the CDS level increases by 104 basis points for a firm without any long-term debt that matures in 2008.
Additionally, the standard deviation of the debt maturity variable (reported in Table 1 ) is 4.6%, so a one-standard-deviation increase in the proportion of long-term debt that matures in 2008 worsens the CDS level by additional 53 basis points, almost half of the impact of the financial crisis on the default risk of an average firm. Table 4 presents the estimates of the effect of firms' pre-crisis cash reserves computed at the end of 2005 on the impact of the financial crisis on their default risk. As discussed in the previous section, I
construct two different measures of excess cash holdings. Table 4 reports the estimates for both of them.
Since the estimation results are very similar for the two excess cash holding measures, not a surprise given their high correlation reported in Table 2 , I only discuss the result with excess cash holding computed from the first specification in this paper. In column 1 of Table 4 , I include only the dummy variable, the interaction of the dummy variable and excess cash holdings, and firm fixed effects. The estimate of the dummy variable is positive and statistically significant, consistent with the findings that the financial crisis increases the default risk of an average firm. The estimate of the interaction term is negative and statistically significant at 5% level. It shows that the increase in default risk is substantially higher for firms that had low excess cash reserves one and half year prior to the onset of the crisis. The coefficient estimate imply a 183 basis point increase in CDS spreads for a firm with no excess cash reserves, and no decline for a firm holding 65% of assets in excess cash reserves.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 further control for firm characteristics and CDS liquidity. The estimated coefficients on the dummy variable as well as the interaction term remain economically large and statistically significant. The estimates in column 3 imply that the CDS spread increases by 172 basis points for a firm without any excess cash reserves at the end of 2005, and that excess cash holding of 58% of assets eliminate the increase. In addition, the standard deviation of excess cash holdings (reported in 1) is 9.6%, so the estimate in Column 3 imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in excess cash reserves mitigates the increase in CDS spreads by 28 basis points, or about 16% of the increase for a firm without any excess cash holdings. Furthermore, the magnitude and t-statistic of the interaction coefficient have barely changed compared to the values in Columns 1 and 2. This suggests that the effect of excess cash holdings on the impact of financial crisis on CDS spreads is above and beyond its impact on firm characteristics and CDS liquidity.
Among the control variables, most of the estimated coefficients are consistent with the predictions from the structural credit risk models. For example, the coefficients are positive for leverage and firm risk measured by cash flow volatility. They are negative for profitability, assets growth, sales growth, Tobin's Q, credit rating, and a liquidity proxy for the CDS contract. Additionally, firm characteristic variables, such as leverage, cash flow volatility, asset growth, Tobin's Q, and credit rating, are consistently statistically significant across various specifications. The liquidity proxy for CDS contracts, i.e. the number of dealers providing CDS quotes for a firm, is also consistently statistically significant. Its parameter estimate, around -0.050%, imply that additional dealer providing CDS quotes for a firm is Overall, the results in Table 5 suggest that it is unlikely that the main results obtained in this paper are endogenously driven by some spurious or mechanical factors. I further address the concerns in the next section by studying the interaction between internal financial resources and financial constraints.
Financial Constraints
In this section, I investigate how the effects of the financial crisis vary in the cross-section of firms by financial constraints. Corporate finance literature on financial constraints suggests that shocks in the supply of external finance will have a more pronounced effect on the activities of financially constrained firms, and possibly affect their default risk too. I empirically examine whether the impact of the financial crisis on default risk is more severe for financially constrained firms. Four measures of financing constraints are considered in the paper: the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index, the Whited and Wu (2006) index, firm sizes as measured by total assets, and bond ratings provided by Standard & Poor's. All of these measures are standard in the literature, and their construction is described in the previous section. As I do for debt maturity and excess cash holdings, I compute financial constraint measures using the 2005 data. Table 6 reports the regression results. Three of the four parameter estimates on the interaction of the dummy variable and financial constraint measures are large and highly statistically significant, the one exception being the constraint measure based on firm sizes. The results on the three significant financial constraint measures show that default risk increases for both unconstrained and constrained firms following the onset of the crisis, and the increase is significantly larger for financially constrained firms. The estimate from the regression using the KZ index as the constraint measure implies an increase of 77 basis points in CDS spreads following the onset of the crisis for a firm with the KZ index equal to zero. Additionally, the standard deviation of the KZ index (reported in Table1) is 1.56, so the estimate in column 1 of The coefficient estimate on the interaction of the dummy variable and the constraint measure based on firm sizes is negative, consistent with the hypothesis that the financial crisis has a more sever effect on the default risk of small firms. The estimate, however, is not statistically significant, probably due to the fact that the average firm used in this study has much larger size than those used in other studies.
In addition, the variation in firm sizes is small, in part contributing to an insignificant coefficient.
I next consider how the interaction between firms' internal financial conditions and external financial constraints affects the impact of the financial crisis on default risk. Firms are divided into three groups, labeled as low, medium, and high, according to the ranking of the four financial constraints respectively.
In addition to the interactions of the crisis dummy with the three financial constraint dummies, I also introduce the interactions of the crisis dummy, the financial constraint dummies, and firms' pre-crisis financial conditions into the base regression. This approach is basically a pooled panel regression with firm-level dummy variables interacting with the crisis dummy variable and internal financial conditions.
The estimation results are presented in Table 7 .
In Table 7 , the coefficients on the interaction of the crisis dummy variable with the financial constraint dummies correspond to the post-crisis increase in CDS spreads for a firm either without any long-term debt that matures in 2008 or with zero excess cash holdings in each financial constraint group. The coefficient estimates are consistent with the results reported in Table 6 , i.e., the impact of the crisis on default risk is more severe for a financially constrained firm. Except for firm size, every point estimates are monotonically increasing with financial constraint measures. The magnitude of the effect can be better understood by comparing the coefficient estimates for different groups. For example, from the regression using the debt maturity variable, the coefficient estimates across the four measures of financial constraints average an additional 147 basis point increase in CDS spreads for the most constrained firm comparing to the least constrained firm following the onset of the financial crisis, which is more than double the increase in CDS spreads for the least constrained firms.
Moreover, the estimates for the interaction of the crisis dummy, the financial constraint dummies, and firms' pre-crisis financial condition in Table 7 suggest that the relation between firms' pre-crisis financial conditions and post-crisis default risk is generally stronger for firms that are financially constrained. The point estimate from the regressions using the debt maturity variable goes in this direction in three of the four financial constrain measures, the exception being the firm size measure. The coefficient estimate is also statistically significant for the most financially constrained group except in the case of using firm sizes to measure financial constraint. The coefficient estimate in two other groups is generally not significant.
It suggests that, for firms used in this study, their pre-crisis decision on long-term debt structure worsens the impact of the crisis on default risk only for firms that are in the top category in terms of financial constraint measures. The magnitude of the point estimate from the regressions using excess cash holdings generally increases with the financial constraint measures. For the most constrained group, two out of four estimates are statistically significant, the exception being the KZ index and the bond rating. It seems that firms' cash holdings mitigate the increase of default risk following the onset of the crisis only for the most financially constrained firms. As discussed elsewhere in this paper, the result probably reflects the fact that the availability of CDS data excludes many firms that do not issue many corporate bonds, have no credit ratings, and thus are likely more financially constrained than those included in this study.
Nevertheless, the effect of firms' debt structure and excess cash holdings on mitigating or worsening the impact of the crisis on default risk is still economically large for the most financially constrained firms. To illustrate magnitudes, the coefficient estimate from the regression using the debt maturity and the KZ index suggests an additional increase of 129 basis points in CDS spreads for a most constrained firm without any long-term debt that matures in 2008 comparing to a similar firm that is in the least constrained group. If that firm has to refinance its long-term debt equivalent to 5.1% of ( the onestandard-deviation of the debt maturity variable for the most constrained group) total assets in 2008, there is an extra 117 basis point increase in CDS spreads, or about 91% of the difference of the increase in CDS spreads between a firm that is most financially constrained and one that is least constrained.
The financial consequence of a firm's decision on its debt structure is substantial for a most financially constrained firm. The coefficient estimates for the other measures of financial constrains suggest a similar magnitude.
On the other hand, the effect of excess cash reserves in mitigating the impact of the crisis on default risk of a financially constrained firm is also considerable. Take an example of the regression using the WW index, the coefficient estimate suggests an additional increase of 149 basis point increase in CDS spreads for a most constrained firm with zero excess cash reserves comparing to a similar firm that is least constrained. However, if the most constrained firm holds excess cash reserves equivalent to 9.5% (the one-standard-deviation of excess cash holdings for the most financially constrained group) of total assets, it will reduce the increase in CDS spreads for 51 basis points, or about 33% of the difference of the increase in CDS spreads between a firm that is most financially constrained and one that is least constrained.
The evidence presented here suggests an important role of cash holdings in mitigating the default risk of financially constrained firm. Previous corporate finance literature (see, e.g., Harford ( (2008)) highlights agency cost associated with corporate cash holdings. In contrast, this paper presents beneficial role that seemingly "excess" cash holdings play in mitigating the impact of the financial crisis on the default risk of financially constrained firms. Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) research a similar conclusion studying investment behavior of US companies during the financial crisis.
Overall, the evidence presented in this section is consistent with the hypotheses proposed by He and
Xiong (2010) and Morris and Shin (2009) that a firm's short-term financing needs can magnifying the effect of a liquidity shock on its default risk, while holding extra cash reserves can mitigate the impact.
Furthermore, these two economic channels are more important for financially constrained firms.
Conclusion
In this paper, I study the effect of the credit crisis that began in August 2007 on default risk of US industrial firms. The crisis represents an exogenous liquidity shock to the US corporate sector due to the sudden reduction in the supply of external finance from the financial institutions. Comparing CDS spreads before and after the onset of the crisis, I find that default risk of US industrial firms increases significantly, controlling for firm fixed effects and time-varying firm characteristics that related to default risk. Using the base specification, I find that the CDS spread increases by 123 basis points of its unconditional mean following the onset of the crisis, almost equivalent to the unconditional mean of the CDS spread before the crisis.
More importantly, I use this event to test the hypotheses proposed by He and Xiong (2010) and Morris and Shin (2009) on the interaction between liquidity risk and default risk, and investigate the potential roles of firms' internal financing needs and external financial constraints in mitigating or worsening the impact of the crisis. I explore cross-firm variations in their long-term debt maturity, and construct a plausible exogenous measure of firms' short-term financing needs following the onset of the crisis. In addition, using pre-crisis data, I compute seemingly "excess" cash holdings to measure firms' internal cash resources during the crisis. The measures are less susceptible to the criticism of endogenous relation among contemporary short-term debt, cash holdings, and default risk. Consistent with the predictions in He and Xiong (2010) and Morris and Shin (2009) , firms' short-term funding needs greatly magnify the increase in default risk after the liquidity shock, while extra cash reserves considerably mitigate the increase. The coefficient estimate suggests an extra 53 basis point increase in CDS spreads for a firm that needs to finance additional long-term debt equivalent to 4.6% of its total assets. However, holding extra cash reserves equivalent to 9.6% of total assets dampens the increase in CDS spreads by 28 basis points. To further alleviate endogenous concerns, I measure these financial positions as much as three and half years prior to the crisis and find similar results. The falsification test shows that firms' short-term funding needs and cash reserves matter only when facing a liquidity shock.
I also investigate the interaction between firms' internal financial positions and external financial constraints. The crisis has larger effect on default risk for the financially constrained firms. The difference in the increase in CDS spreads, following the onset of the crisis, between a most financially constrained firm and a least constrained firm is well over 100 basis points across difference specifications. In addition, firms' short-term funding needs greatly worsen the impact of the crisis for most financially constrained firms, while excess cash reserves considerably dampen the impact for the most constrained. Illustrated by the regression results with the KZ index and debt maturity variable, a one-standard-deviation increase in short-term funding needs for the most financially constrained firm exacerbates the impact of the crisis on default risk by adding additional 117 basis points to CDS spreads. On the other hand, a one-standarddeviation increase in excess cash reserves for the most financially constrained firms reduces the increase in CDS spreads by 51 basis points, according to the regression results with the WW index. The availability of CDS data probably biases the sample used in this paper towards less financially constrained firms.
Accordingly, the results should be interpreted as a lower bound on the impact of the financial crisis on the default risk of US industrial firms.
The results presented in this study have important implications for academics, practitioners, and policy makers alike. For academics, the results point to specific economic channels that are likely to be fruitful in improving our current credit risk models by providing a better understanding of the interaction between default risk and liquidity risk, and the interaction between internal financing resources and external financial constraints. A number of studies (see, e.g., Asvanunt, Broadie, and Sundaresan (2010 ), Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2009 ), and Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011 ) have made considerable progress in this direction. For practitioners, understanding the implications of credit risk and liquidity risk on fixed-income securities aids in both firm-level issuance decisions and hedging strategies of fixed income portfolio managers. If liquidity risk interacts with default risk, hedging one risk against the other becomes more confounded. Finally, the work is important to policy makers, whose objective is the stability of financial markets, because it suggests ways to monitor the default risk of financial institutions 3 and points out the shortcoming of the traditional credit risk models that ignore the interaction between liquidity risk and default risk.
Appendix
Variable definitions: All names in parentheses refer to the Compustat item names.
Size = Natural log of total assets (atq).
Cash holding = Cash and short-term investments (cheq) / total assets (atq).
Leverage = (Debt in Current Liabilities (dcq) + long-term debt (dlttq)) / total assets (atq).
Cash flow = (Income before extraordinary items (ibq) + depreciation and amortization (dpq)) / total assets (atq).
Cash Flow Volatility = Standard deviations of cash flow in the last 5 years. Profitability = Operating income before depreciation (oibdq) / total assets (atq)
Asset growth = Log difference of total assets (atq) between quarter t and t-1.
Sales growth = Log difference of sales (saleq) between quarter t and t-1.
Tobin's Q = Market value of assets (total assets (atq) + market value of common equity (cashoq*prccq)
-common equity(ceqq) -deferred taxes(txdbq)) / (0.9*book value of assets(atq) + 0.1*market value of assets). CAPEX = Quarterly capital expenditure / total assets (atq). Because capital expenditure is reported on a year-to date basis in quarterly financial statements, I subtract the previous quarter's capital expenditure(capxy) from the current quarter's capital expenditure. NWC = Net working capital excluding cash (current assets(atq) -current liabilities(lctq) -cash(cheq)) / total assets (atq). This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in this study. CDS is the end of quarter quotes of a 5-year CDS contract. LVG is the firm leverage computed as the ratio of the sum of short-term and long-term debt to total assets. CFV is the cash flow volatility computed from past 5-year quarterly data of cash flows. PRFT is the profitability measure computed as the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets. LNTA is the natural log of total assets. AGT is the asset growth rate. SGT is the sales growth rate. TBQ is Tobin's Q computed as the ratio of the market value of assets to the sum of 0.9 times book value of assets and 0. 
